Touro Law Review
Volume 8

Number 1

Article 5

1991

Indigents and the Denial of Due Process at Involuntary Treatment
Hearings: The Need for Independent Psychiatric Assistance
Marcy H. Speiser

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Disability Law Commons, Social Welfare
Law Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons

Recommended Citation
Speiser, Marcy H. (1991) "Indigents and the Denial of Due Process at Involuntary Treatment Hearings: The
Need for Independent Psychiatric Assistance," Touro Law Review: Vol. 8: No. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/5

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Speiser: Treatment Hearings

INDIGENTS AND THE DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS AT INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT HEARINGS: THE NEED FOR
INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION

At first glance, the due process rights guaranteed in New York
State to an indigent involuntarily committed mentally ill patient
appear to be sufficient. For example, the New York Court of
Appeals has attempted to guarantee due process protection to indigent patients as evidenced by the 1986 decision in Rivers v.
Katz, 1 which recognized the right of involuntarily committed
mentally ill patients to refuse antipsychotic medication. 2 The

Rivers case established the right of involuntarily committed patients to obtain a hearing to contest unwanted treatment. 3 Thus, a
patient is susceptible to involuntary treatment programs through
the state's police powers only when that patient is adjudicated
dangerous or, according to Rivers, through the state's parens
patriae powers when the patient is incapable of making a
reasoned decision regarding treatment. 4 The determination of
1. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
2. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 ("[E]very
individual of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body.") (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)). In Rivers, the New York Court
of Appeals held that an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient has a
liberty interest in determining the course of his or her own medical treatment
and, therefore, has a right to refuse treatment. Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341,
504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. However, the court recognized that this right is not
absolute and may have to yield to compelling state interests. Id. at 495, 495
N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80. The state may forcibly medicate when the
patient presents a danger to himself or herself or to others, or when he or she
engages in potentially destructive behavior. Id. In these situations, the state
may act according to its police powers. Id.
3. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 343-44, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
4. Id. at 495-96, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
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whether a patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision
regarding treatment is made at a "Rivers hearing." 5 Additionally,
an indigent "civil committee" 6 who is in danger of being forcibly
medicated, is provided with legal assistance 7 in accordance with
due process rights enumerated in the New York State
Constitution. 8 Finally, section 35 of the Judiciary Law9 affords
the court discretion to appoint no more than two neutral
psychiatrists to aid the court in making its determination. 10
At face value, the aggregate of statutory protections, common
law guarantees, and state constitutional rights appear to adequately safeguard the indigent civil committee's liberty interests.
5. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
6. Throughout this Comment the term "civil committee" refers to a
patient who is involuntarily hospitalized in a psychiatric center.
7. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.07 (McKinney 1988). Section 9.07
provides:
(a) Immediately upon the admission of any patient to a hospital or upon
his conversion to a different status, the director shall inform the patient
in writing of his status, including the section of this chapter under
which he is hospitalized, and of his rights under this article, including
the availability of the mental hygiene legal service. At any time
thereafter, upon the request of the patient or of anyone on the patient's
behalf, the patient shall be permitted to communicate with the mental
hygiene legal service and avail himself of the facilities thereof.
(b) The director of every hospital shall post copies of a notice, in a form
and manner to be determined by the commissioner, at places throughout
the hospital where such notice shall be conspicuous and visible to all
patients, stating the following:
1. the availability of the mental hygiene legal service.
2. a general statement of the rights of patients under the various
admission or retention provisions of this article.
3. the right of the patient to communicate with the director, the board of
visitors, the commissioner of mental health, and the mental hygiene
legal service.
Id.
8. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.").
9. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991).
10. See Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 315, § 1, 1985 N.Y. Laws 889, 889
(McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. JUD. LAW § 34(4) (McKinney
Supp. 1991)). For a discussion regarding court appointed neutral psychiatrists
provided for in Section 35, see infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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A closer look, however, reveals the absence of the most
important element of protection against involuntary treatment.
The indigent involuntary patient is unable to construct an

adequate defense to allegations of incompetency or dangerousness11 because the patient is denied the opportunity to retain an
independent psychiatrist at the state's expense. 12 As will be
discussed, denial of this necessary element invariably leads to a
gross disadvantage and a violation of the patient's due process
rights.

Part I of this Comment will illuminate the inadequacies of the
common law and statutory provisions that have been the only
source of protection for indigent civil committees to date.
Specifically, Part I section A will discuss how the rights established in Rivers v. Katz1 3 are constructively denied. Part I section
B will examine the inadequacy of court-appointed neutral psychiatrists. Part I section C will propose that due to the immense
impact of medical testimony upon the disposition of involuntary
treatment hearings, access to an independent psychiatrist is indispensable in the construction of an indigent civil committee's defense. Part II of this Comment will present a survey of the judicial activism that has taken place in the criminal arena by recognizing the indispensability of medical experts in creating and presenting an insanity defense for the indigent criminal defendant.
This Comment will conclude with an argument supporting the
extension of such judicial activism into forcible medication hearings due to the quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings. 14 An
analogy will be drawn between the special position and needs of
11. The constitutionality of court orders providing for forcible medication
in psychiatric centers for short-term dangerousness rather than incompetency
has not been clearly decided in New York and is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
12. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991); infra notes 4577 and accompanying text.
13. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).

14. This Comment will discuss and demonstrate that due process concerns
in both the criminal judicial proceeding and the civil involuntary treatment
hearing are similar in nature, as both the patient and the criminal are afforded
many of the same procedural safeguards. See infra notes 205-60 and
accompanying text.
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the indigent patient in danger of forced medical treatment and
that of the criminal defendant who relies on an insanity defense.
I. THE INADEQUACY OF NEW YORK'S
COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
IN SAFEGUARDING DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
GUARANTEED BY THE NEW YORK
STATE CONSTITUTION
A. The ConstructiveDenial of Rights Establishedby Rivers v.
Katz
In Rivers v. Katz, 15 the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed
the common law right, recognized in In re Storar,16 of an individual to refuse medical treatment, whether such treatment is
15. 67 N.Y.2d at 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
16. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981). In In re Storar, the New York Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of whether two incompetent patients, an eighty-three year old man
being maintained by a respirator and a fifty-two year old profoundly retarded
man with terminal cancer, had a right to refuse medical treatment that was
being used to prolong their lives. Id. at 369, 420 N.E.2d at 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d
at 268. The court unequivocally stated that a competent adult has a common
law right in New York to refuse medical treatment "although the treatment
may be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life." Id. at 377,
420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273. However, the court noted that the
State of New York has a "legitimate interest in protecting the lives of its
citizens" and, therefore, the common law right should yield to the state's
interests in certain circumstances. Id. In addition, the court adopted a "clear
and convincing" standard of proof when it is alleged that a person,
subsequently rendered incompetent, would have wanted medical treatment
terminated in the event that there was no hope of recovery. Id. at 379, 420
N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. Applying this standard the court
concluded that there was "clear and convincing" evidence that the eighty-three
year old patient made the decision to terminate treatment before he became
incompetent, but that the state could require treatment for the fifty-two year
old profoundly retarded patient because he had always been incompetent and,
therefore, unable to make reasoned decisions regarding medical treatment. Id.
at 378-82, 420 N.E.2d at 71-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-76.
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simply beneficial or absolutely necessary to preserve life. 17 The
court proceeded to extend this right to the involuntarily committed mentally ill patient as "coextensive with the patient's liberty
interest protected by the due process clause of our State
Constitution." ' 18 The Rivers court held that involuntary commitment, without more, is not a sufficient basis to assume the lack of
mental capacity necessary to make a reasoned decision regarding
medical treatment. 19 Thus, the court established the common law
right of an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient to obtain a
hearing to determine mental capacity prior to involuntary medical
treatment. 20 Although the Rivers court was genuinely concerned
with the civil committee's "autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference, ' 2 1 it recognized that the right to refuse
medication may have to yield to compelling state interests. 22
Accordingly, the state may, via its police powers, 2 3 authorize the
administration of medication over the patient's objection, when
the "patient presents a danger to himself or to other members of
society or engages in dangerous or potentially destructive conduct
within the institution .
"..."24
In the event the state's police
power is exercised, the state may forcibly medicate the patient as
long as the emergency situation persists. 25 Furthermore, the state
may medicate over a patient's objection pursuant to its parens
17. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
The court of appeals recognized that our system of government cherishes free
choice and individual autonomy. Id. (citing In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 377,
420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273).
18. Id.; see also N.Y. CONS. art. I, § 6.
19. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493-94, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d at
79.
20. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
21. Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
22. Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
23. See generally 8 THE GUIDE TO AtMERICAN LAW 219 (West 1984).
Police power has been defined as "[t]he authority conferred upon the states by

the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution and which the states delegate to their
political subdivisions to enact measures to preserve and protect the safety,
health, and welfare of the community." Id.

24. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
25. Id. at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
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patriae powers26 if it is determined at the Rivers hearing, by
clear and convincing evidence, that a patient lacks the capacity to
make a reasoned decision regarding the proposed treatment. 27
Still, the court strongly stated in dictum that the patient's decision
must be respected in order "to insure that the greatest possible
protection is accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted
interference with the furtherance of his own desires." 2 8 Clearly,
26. In Rivers, the court noted that since there was no claim that the
involuntarily committed patients were a danger to themselves or to others, the
state's police power would not justify forced medication. 67 N.Y.2d at 496,
495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80. Rather, the court determined that the
respondents were relying upon the state's parens patriae interest as
justification for administration of medication over the patient's objections. Id.
The court stated that invocation of the state's parens patriae power was
appropriate when "the individual himself [is] incapable of making a competent
decision concerning treatment on his own." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980)). Consequently, the court held that the decision
whether the patient has the capacity to make a competent decision regarding
his treatment should be made at a de novo hearing. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at
344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81. See also Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosp.
Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 342, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (1st Dep't 1987) ("The
state has a legitimate interest under its parenspatriae powers in providing care
to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves . . ...
"); see generally

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) ("Parens Patriae originates
from the English common law where the King had a royal prerogative to act as
guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants.").
27. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
See, e.g., In re McConnell, 147 A.D.2d 881, 882-83, 538 N.Y.S.2d 101,
102-03 (3d Dep't 1989) (pursuant to the state's parens patriae interest,
forcible medication was justified).
28. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
Moreover, in the event a determination is made that the patient lacks the
capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding his or her treatment, the
concern for the patient's autonomy does not subside. Rather, "the court must
determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to give
substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest, taking into consideration all
relevant circumstances ...... Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at
81. See also Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 257 (1891) (plaintiff
could not be compelled over her objection to submit to a pre-trial surgical
examination); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(right to refuse medical treatment is inherent in the concept of "liberty"
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Erickson
v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
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the Rivers court intended to give full effect to a patient's dignity
29
and liberty interests.
In exercising the right to a Rivers hearing, expert medical testimony is crucial in three ways. First, such testimony will greatly
impact upon whether one will be retained involuntarily. 30
Second, expert medical testimony often directly addresses the is-

sue of a patient's short-term dangerousness or capability of making a reasoned decision regarding treatment. 3 1 Finally, medical
testimony will be used to determine whether a forced treatment
program is narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to a
patient's liberty interest. 32
Although the New York Court of Appeals has recognized that
there is a liberty interest at stake, as it required a hearing prior to
involuntary treatment, 33 New York courts have been ambivalent
with regard to procedural protections afforded to the civil committee. 34 Although an indigent patient is provided with an apCounty 1962) ("[I]t is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision
who has the final say and that this must necessarily be so in a system of
government which gives the greatest possible protection to the individual in the
furtherance of his own desires.").
29. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81
(due process requires a balance of the individual's liberty interest against the
state's asserted compelling needs).
30. See Hiday, JudicialDecisions in Civil Commitment: Facts, Attitudes,
and PsychiatricRecommendations, 17 LAW& Soc'y REv. 517, 526-27 (1983)
(Studies. showed that "both the 'facts' and psychiatric opinion significantly
influence court decisions in civil commitment cases....'); infra notes 78-95
and accompanying text.
31. See Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures:An Empirical Study in
the Courtroom, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 651, 655 (1977) [hereinafter Reformed
Commitment] ("Judges and lawyers tend to be unaware of the weak basis of
psychiatric prediction of dangerousness, and hence frequently defer to such
'expert' opinion."); infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
32. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
33. Id.
34. See Ughetto v. Acrish, 130 A.D.2d 12, 24, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398, 405
(2d Dep't 1987) (allowing counsel to observe prehearing psychiatric
examinations); Lesser v. Carmela, 146 Misc. 2d 1072, 1075, 554 N.Y.S.2d
953, 955 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1989) (requiring that an involuntarily
committed patient have the right to be represented at the initial review of
request for administration of antipsychotic medication).
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pointed attorney, 35 the patient is not afforded the opportunity to
meet with a medical expert of his choice. 36 Functions of an independent psychiatrist may include gathering facts, examining the
patient, assisting the appointed attorney in preparing a defense by
analyzing information, drawing conclusions, and scrutinizing
conclusions and opinions formed by the hospital psychiatrist expected to testify on behalf of the state. 37 Without an independent
psychiatrist, the court's reliance on any medical testimony is
based on interpretations and conclusions of the hospital's psychiatrist only. 38 As a result, the patient's due process rights are violated and the hearing provided to protect these rights is
transformed into a mere exercise of formality. 39 Rivers' promise
However, recent New York case law suggests a limitation of due process
protection during a civil commitment hearing. See, e.g., Savastano v.
Nurnberg, 152 A.D.2d 290, 299, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555, 560 (2d Dep't 1989)
("[N]either under the Federal nor State Constitution is there any basis for
requiring a judicial hearing prior to the transfer of patients who object to their
transfers from municipal facilities to State psychiatric facilities."), aff'd, 77
N.Y.2d 300, 569 N.E.2d 421, 567 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1990); Ughetto, 130
A.D.2d at 19, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 402 ("It would, however, be equally inflexible
to suggest that since confinement to a State mental hospital is a form of
imprisonment, all protections afforded by the bill of rights to a criminal
defendant must... be likewise afforded to a person thought to be dangerously
mentally ill.").
35. See N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 9.07 (McKinney 1988); supra note 7.
36. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991). Section 35(4)
provides for the appointment of no more than two psychiatrists, psychologists
or physicians to examine the patient and testify at the hearing. Id. For a
detailed discussion regarding section 35 of the Judiciary Law see infra notes
45-52 and accompanying text.
37. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80 (1985) ("[T]hey analyze the
information gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the
defendant's mental condition. . ... "); Farrell, The Right of an Indigent Civil
Commitment Defendant to PsychiatricAssistance of His Own Choice at State
Expense, 11 IDAHo L. REV. 141, 145 (1975) [hereinafter Farrell] ("The
fumctions such an expert could be expected to perform might include
examination of the defendant, working with his counsel, and testifying on his
behalf at the commitment hearing.").
38. For a discussion concerning the immense impact of medical testimony,
see infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
39. See Anonymous No. 1 v. La Burt, 17 N.Y.2d 738, 217 N.E.2d 31,
270 N.Y.S.2d 206, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 936 (1966). In La Burt, the New
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of due process protection, that is, to give full effect to a patient's

dignity, 40 is thus in danger of becoming an empty one.
While this deprivation of constitutional rights is unfair and appalling in a civil commitment hearing, 41 this writer believes that
the effect of this deprivation is especially egregious when the
hearing is to determine whether an involuntary patient should be
forcibly medicated. This is so because when one is subjected to
forcible medication, his body is violated in a most intrusive and
personal way. 42 Beyond this, common side effects produced by
York Court of Appeals held that an inmate of a state hospital who challenges a
finding of incompetence, on the return of a writ of habeas corpus, may request
the court to appoint an independent psychiatrist in a civil commitment hearing.
Id. at 740, 217 N.E.2d at 32, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 207. Other jurisdictions have
recognized the absolute necessity of an independent psychiatrist during a civil
commitment hearing. See, e.g., In re Gannon, 123 N.J.Super. 104, 106, 301
A.2d 493, 494 (Somerset County Ct. 1973) ("Such a hearing is of little value,
if not actually a sham, when the only testimony is that of the certifying
psychiatrist.").
40. In Rivers, the court stated that the right to refuse medical treatment is
protected by the due process clause of the New York State Constitution and
"extends equally to mentally ill persons who are not to be treated as persons of
lesser status or dignity because of their illness." 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495
N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. In addition, the court reasoned that "[ilf
the law recognizes the right of an individual to make decisions about ... life
out of respect for the dignity and autonomy of the individual, that interest is
no less significant when the individual is mentally or physically ill." Id.
(ellipses in original) (quoting In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1980)).
41. See Savastano v. Numberg, 152 A.D.2d 290, 299, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555,
560 (2d Dep't 1989) ("It is beyond cavil that involuntarily-admitted mentallyill patients have liberty interests subject to Federal and State constitutional
requirements of due process, which are not abandoned at the facility door."),
aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 300, 569 N.E.2d 421, 567 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1990) (citing,
inter alia, Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1986)); Ughetto v. Acrish, 130 A.D.2d 12, 18, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (2d
Dep't 1987) (procedures must conform to the dictates of due process).
42. The process of forcible medication entails another person
administering a foreign, mind altering substance into the patient's body. See
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1982) (antipsychotic drugs are "mind
altering"). The involuntarily committed patient, therefore, must not only
withstand confinement, but must be subjected to a bodily infringement that
will devour whatever dignity remains. Consequently, any deprivation during a
Rivers hearing is unquestionably egregious. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford,

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1991

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 [1991], Art. 5

150

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 8

the most frequently used drugs in treating mental illness can be

heinous, as well as irreversible. 4 3 The failure to sufficiently protect liberty interests extended to the indigent civil committee by
Rivers is a potential license for the state to subject a patient to
possibly unneeded, and certainly unwanted, treatment that may
result in irreversible side effects. 44 Therefore, the due process
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by common law, than the right to every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.").
43. The most serious effect of antipsychotic medications is tardive
dyskinesia, a disabling disorder that is often irreversible. See HARRISON'S
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2104, 2105 (11th ed. 1987) [hereinafter
HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES] ("Usually the symptoms of tardive dyskinesia appear
late and consist of involuntary repetitive movements of the lips, tongue
(tongue thrusting, lip smacking, etc.) and not infrequently, of the extremities
and trunk."); see also Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic
Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion : Legally Relevant
Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 77, 108 (1983) ("A

long term side effect that is often referred to in court decisions on the right to
refuse treatment is tardive dyskinesia."); Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental
Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 MIAMI L. REv. 1, 71
(1989) ("Tardive dyskinesia [is] a persistent neurological syndrome affecting a
substantial percentage of patients subjected to long-term antipsychotic drug
treatment . . ."). Although the exact percentage of patients who develop
tardive dyskinesia is unclear, reports disclose that the percentage of patients
who suffer from the condition can be as high as 60% and as low as 10%. See
AMERIcAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON LATE NEUROLOGICAL

EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS, TARDivE DYSKINESA 43-44

(1979);

SCHATZBERG & COLE, MANUAL OF CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY

99

(1986).
44. Common side effects which accompany the use of antipsychotic
medications include: muscle spasms of the eyes, arms and face; drowsiness and
depression; weight-gain; lethargy; postal hypotension; skin pigmentation and
hypersensitivity to sunlight; and male impotence. The most bothersome side
effects are muscle dystonic reactions (a Parkinson's Syndrome-like reaction),
and akathesia (restlessness and agitation). See Plotkin, Limiting the

Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patient'sRight to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L.
REv. 461, 474-75 (1977); see also HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at
2104 (number of patients that receive antipsychotic drugs for their mental
disorders is a significant majority of patients with serious mental illness);

Note, The Nightmare of Forcible Medication: the New York Court of Appeals
Protects the Rights of the Mentally Ill Under the State Constitution:Rivers v.
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considerations expressed in Rivers are constructively unenforced.
B. Neutral Court Appointees Providedfor in Section 35 of the
JudiciaryLaw Do Not Shield Due Process Rights
One may argue that the solution to such vulnerability on the
part of indigent involuntarily committed mentally ill patients exists in Section 35 of the Judiciary Law. 45 This statute affords the
court discretion to appoint no more than two neutral psychiatrists
"to examine and testify at the [Rivers] hearing upon the condition
of such person." 46 Here, too, the statutory attempt to safeguard
liberty interests established in Rivers for civil committees in danKatz, 53 BROOKLYN L. REv. 885, 886 (1987) (antipsychotic drugs cause
adverse side effects and are often abused in state mental institutions).
45. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991). However, in
Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the Southern District of
New York refused to appoint an independent psychiatrist to assist an
involuntarily committed patient and his counsel at a retention hearing. Id. at
137. The court reasoned that section 35(4) affords an involuntarily committed
patient "all the protections to which they are entitled." Id. Although the court
was cognizant of the fact that judges rely heavily upon the testimony of a
section 35 psychiatrist because "he usually is dealing with an unbiased doctor
who has no stake in the ultimate decision to release or retain the patient," the
court concluded that due process does not demand a "patient psychiatrist"
during retention hearings. Id. at 136-37.
46. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991). Section 35(4)
provides:
In any proceeding described in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this
section, when a person is alleged to be mentally ill, mentally defective
or a narcotic addict, the court which ordered the hearing may appoint no
more than two psychiatrists, certified psychologists or physicians to
examine and testify at the hearing upon the condition of such person. A
psychiatrist, psychologist or physician so appointed shall, upon
completion of his services, receive reimbursement for expenses
reasonably incurred and reasonable compensation for such services, to
be fixed by the court. Such compensation shall not exceed two hundred
dollars if one psychiatrist, psychologist or physician is appointed, or an
aggregate sum of three hundred dollars if two psychiatrists,
psychologists or physicians are appointed, except that in extraordinary
circumstances the court may provide for compensation in excess of the
foregoing limits.
Id. § 35(4).
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ger of being forcibly medicated is insufficient. 4 7 The first reason
for its failure to meet the Rivers standard is that the court has discretion to appoint a section 35 neutral psychiatrist; the court is
not required to do so. 4 8 Secondly, since the section 35 psychiatrist is a neutral witness, the state facility may also call the doctor
as a witness to substantiate their claims. 49 Consequently, if the
section 35 psychiatrist reaches conclusions adverse to the patient's case, the patient is once again without any means to present a meaningful defense. 50 Most importantly, the appointed
psychiatrist, regardless of his opinion or interpretation of the underlying facts, is not appointed to aid the defendant in preparation
of his case or defense. 5 1 Rather, the psychiatrist is a completely
neutral party, and therefore, will not aid the patient's attorney by
interpreting conclusions made by the state facility's psychiatrist. 5 2

In 1969, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted a request for an independent psychiatrist as a plea to
"shop around" for a medical expert who would give the patient a
47. In Rivers, the court unequivocally reaffirmed the common-law right of
a competent adult to refuse medical treatment and stated that "[t]his commonlaw right is coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the due
process clause of our State Constitution." 67 N.Y.2d at 493, 495 N.E.2d at
341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (emphasis added).
48. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991); supra note 46;
see also Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp 132, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (presiding
judge has discretion to make such appointment).
49. See Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Movement Toward Voluntary
Treatment, 62 CALiF. L. REv. 671, 745 (1974) [hereinafter Wexler]. Wexler
found that cross-examination of neutral expert witnesses is often meaningless
and stated "the psychiatrist might report only those portions of the prospective
patient's comments and actions which would support an inference that the
individual was disturbed, even though 99 percent of what he or she said and
did would be entirely consistent with what we regard as normal behavior." Id.
50. It is widely recognized that psychiatric opinion will vary in the area of
diagnosis. However, "[t]he use of court-appointed experts who jointly
examine the mentally ill person may obscure the existence of these differences,
if diagnosis is up at all, since professional give-and-take may result in
presenting the court with a compromise diagnosis." Farrell, supra note 37, at
182-83.
51. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991); supra note 46.
52. See id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/5

12

Speiser: Treatment Hearings

1991]

TREATMENT HEARINGS

favorable diagnosis during a civil commitment hearing. 5 3
Further, the court reasoned that a physician expert witness is not
partisan to the state's cause simply because he is paid by the state
to examine a patient and testify as to his diagnosis. 54 Rather, the
court stated that the roles of an expert witness and that of an appointed attorney are similar because both exercise independent
judgment even though they are paid by the state. 5 5 The court
concluded that an expert witness is properly involved in judicial
proceedings as a neutral assistant to the court.5 6 Finally, the
court cautioned against transforming treatment hearings into a
battle of the experts, each owing "partisan allegiance to some
litigant." 57
This argument is seriously flawed for four reasons. First, and
most importantly, although an appointed counsel is paid by the
state, he is not hired to play a neutral role, as is the appointed
expert physician witness. 58 The appointed attorney's job is not to
render neutral opinions based on underlying facts. Rather, the
function of the appointed attorney is to represent his client zeal53. See Proctor v. Harris, 413 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Proctor, the
court did not recognize the relief sought as an attempt to protect an indigent
civil committee's due process rights and freedom from unwanted bodily
invasion, but only as a quest for an expert to "guidel] the lawyer in how to
conduct cross-examination of other psychiatrists .... " Id. at 385.
54. Id. at 386 (quoting McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 155 (1st Cir.
1951)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 387 (quoting De Marcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698, 700
(D.C. Cir. 1943)).
57. Id.
58. See Polk v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk, the Supreme Court
rejected the respondent's claim that a public defender acts under color of state
law when exercising his or her independent professional judgment in a
criminal proceeding. Id. at 319-25. Rather, the Court stated that "[o]nce a
lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused, the duties and
obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or
serving in a legal aid or defender program." Id. at 318 (quoting ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980)). The majority
concluded by finding that "[a]lthough the employment relationship is certainly
a relevant factor, we find it insufficient to establish that a public defender acts
under color of state law within the meaning of §1983." Id. at 321.
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ously, defend his client, and protect his client's rights to the best
of his ability. 59 Therefore, an appointed counsel's role cannot be
compared to that of a court appointed medical expert who is
simply another arm of the court. The second flaw in the Proctor
argument is that a wealthy client can retain an expert to aid in the
preparation of his defense. 60 Therefore, the Proctor court's theory of the "proper" neutral role of an independent expert 61 is an
actuality only for the indigent civil committee. 62
The Proctor decision failed to address the inequities resulting
from economic disparities between civil committees. The problem was simply dismissed in dictum by stating that poor committees are not entitled to every advantage of wealthy committees. 63
Therefore, the only people who must accept the court's decision
are those who are too poor to circumvent it. Wealthy patients in
danger of forced medication are able to prepare a meaningful defense against serious bodily invasion by presenting experts who
59. In Polk, the Supreme Court reasoned that:
First, a public defender is not amenable to administration direction in
the same sense as other employees of the State .... State decisions may
determine the quality of his law library or the size of his caseload. But a
defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the
servant of an administrative superior. Held to the same standards of
competence and integrity as a private lawyer, a public defender works
under the canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise
of independent judgment on behalf of the client.
Id. (citation omitted).
60. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 188. Farrell noted that the Proctorcourt
did acknowledge that a defendant with financial resources would be able to
find an expert willing to give favorable testimony, "but rejected the notion
that this constituted a deprivation of equal protection." Id.
61. The Proctor court embraced the observations articulated by the court
in McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 155 (1st Cir. 1951), that both the
assigned counsel and appointed physician are "given a purely professional job
to do - counsel to represent the defendant to the best of his ability, the
designated psychiatrists impartially to examine into and report upon the mental
condition of the accused." Proctor,413 F.2d at 386.
62. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 188-89.
63. Proctor, 413 F.2d at 385-86. In rejecting the appellant's plea for an
independent psychiatric examination, the court stated, "[n]either sound
administration, basic fairness, nor constitutional standards require such a
course." Id. at 386.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/5

14

Speiser: Treatment Hearings

1991]

TREATMENT HEARINGS

will recognize weak arguments as well as unsubstantiated interpretations and opinions in the state psychiatrist's diagnosis and
supportive reasoning. 64 The indigent patient, on the other hand,
is compelled to concede major medical issues solely because his
lawyer is not educated in medicine and psychiatry. 65 Although
courts cannot completely repair economic disparities between involuntarily committed patients, dismissal of gross discrimination
based upon economic class cannot be the answer to this problem.
The Proctor decision, therefore, rendered indigent patients' due
process rights ineffective. Such blatant refusal to try to remedy
the denial of due process rights flies directly in the face of

Rivers.66
The third problem with Proctor lies in the misconception that
the request for an independent physician expert is an attempt to
create a battle of the experts, each owing allegiance to either
side. 67 The ultimate goal of aid from an expert witness is quite
64. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) ("By organizing a
defendant's mental history, examination results and behavior . . . the

psychiatrists for each party enable the jury to make its most accurate
determination of the truth on the issue before them.").
65. In his concurring opinion in Proctor, Judge Bazelon wrote:
This court has often pointed out the difficulty a lawyer untutored in the
arcane mysteries of psychiatry may encounter when appointed to
represent an indigent who is mentally disturbed. If the attorney is cut
off from all sources of expert assistance on these matters, the patient
may be effectively denied his right to an adversarial determination of his
mental health and likely dangerousness.
Proctor, 413 F.2d at 389 (Bazelon, ., concurring) (footnote omitted). See
also Farrell, supra note 37, at 186 (expert assistance may enable counsel to
avoid commitment and find alternative solutions for the indigent civil
committee); Wexler, supra note 49, at 745 ("[M]any attorneys accept
psychiatric judgments at face value, possibly because they feel incapable of
challenging such judgments.").
66. See supranotes 15-29 and accompanying text.
67. But see Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The
Goetz court rejected a request to appoint an independent psychiatrist to assist a
patient and his counsel during a retention hearing, and stated that "[i]f, for
example, the state's expert and the patient's expert proffer inconsistent
opinions, the judge will likely seek a third expert, at state expense, to resolve
the dispute." Id. at 136. However, it would be at least paradoxical to refrain
from appointing an independent expert simply because he may actually believe
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the opposite. It is to provide equal protection of the laws to all
civil committees by affording them the opportunity to defend
themselves against allegations of incompetence or dangerousness. 68 The fourth problem with the Proctorrationale is that if an
indigent involuntary patient is provided a hearing to determine
either his competency to make a reasoned decision regarding
treatment, or whether he is dangerous to himself or to others,
there is no reasonable basis for preventing the patient from creat69
ing and presenting an "unspirited defense."
Thus far, the tools provided to an indigent patient to build a defense have not yielded fairness or impartiality. The indigent patient facing a Rivers hearing without the aid of an independent
psychiatrist, must rely solely upon an appointed attorney who,
although educated in the law, may not be equipped to effectively
present a defense or conduct an effective cross-examination of a
psychiatrist simply because he does not possess a wealth of
that antipsychotic medication is not a necessary part of a patient's treatment
plan. The court should not refrain from assisting a patient in the construction
of an adequate defense simply because the patient's rights may actually be
protected by such assistance. The opinion of multiple experts can only aid the
fact-finder in making a determination based upon all possible interpretations of
underlying data. See Farrell, supra note 37, at 185 (Appointment of an
independent psychiatrist insures reliability because the judge will be presented
with various opinions which may, in effect, enable him to "reassume his role
as the real decision-maker."). In addition, the expert may not, contrary to the
Goetz court's belief, "only testify if the patient likes what he is going to say."
Goetz, 769 F. Supp. at 137. Rather, whether or not the independent expert
reaches a favorable diagnosis, the testimony can aid the patient's attorney in
interpreting the diagnosis of the state's expert witness. See infra notes 174-78
and accompanying text.
68. See, Farrell, supra note 37, at 188. Farrell further noted that:
Rather than being a mere luxury, an expert of the defendant's choice
may have the ability to profoundly change the "kind of trial a man
gets," from a non-adversary proceeding in which the decisive expert
opinions go unchallenged to an adversary proceeding in which all
possible challenges to the expert's testimony are made and in which all
information favorable to the defendant is presented. An allegedly
mentally ill person who does have financial resources now has the
ability to effect this qualitative change in a civil commitment hearing.
Id.
69. Id.at 171.
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knowledge about psychiatry. 70 The result of this disadvantage in
the courtroom is almost predetermined. 71 Appointed attorneys
cannot be expected to present an effective defense with respect to
expert medical testimony without the opportunity to consult an
independent psychiatrist (as opposed to a section 35 neutral
psychiatrist) to aid in the interpretation of the state's medical
testimony. Without such help, an attorney cannot possibly
represent his client zealously. 72 "If the attorney is cut off from
all sources of expert assistance on these matters, the patient may
be effectively denied his right to an adversarial determination of
his mental health and likely dangerousness." 7 3 Other states have
been conscious of this problem and have taken the initiative to
70. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court

addressed the issue of whether federal due process requires the appointment of
a psychiatric examination when an indigent's sanity is seriously in question.
Id. at 70. The Court stated that a psychiatrist "know[s] the probative questions
to ask of the opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their
answers." Id. at 80. In addition, the Court noted that "[wihen jurors make this
determination about issues that inevitably are complex and foreign, the
testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and a virtual necessity if an insanity
plea is to have any chance of success." Id. at 81 (quoting Gardiner, The Myth
of the Impartial PsychiatricExpert - Some Comments Concerning Criminal
Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of Therapy, 2 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 99, 113-14 (1976)). Concluding that states rely upon psychiatrists, the
Court stated that "without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a
professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine
whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in
preparing the cross-examination of a State's psychiatric witnessfi, the risk of
an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high." Id. at 82. Lastly,
the Court reasoned that the appointment of a psychiatrist is mandated by the
Constitution when the defendant's sanity is in issue because "lilt is in such
cases that a defense may be devastated by the absence of a psychiatric
examination and testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a
reasonable chance of success." Id. at 83.
71. See Hiday, Judicial Decisons in Civil Commitment: Facts, Attitudes,
and Psychiatric Recommendations, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 517, 526-29
(1983).
72. See Farrell,supra note 37, at 185-87.
73. Proctor, 413 F.2d at 389 (Bazelon, J., concurring). Judge Bazelon
further stated that "if an indigent patient needs and is entitled to a lawyer, far
more may he also need the assistance of a psychiatrist in the preparation of his
case." Id.
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provide for such an effective defepse. 74 The final problem with

section 35 court appointed medical experts is the scarce number
75
of psychiatrists willing to serve on the section 35 panel.
Therefore, if the patient motions for a section 35 psychiatrist and
if the court grants the motion, the physicians willing to participate
will be few and far between. One reason physicians are hesitant
to serve as section 35 medical experts is that two hundred
dollars 76 is a de minimis amount of compensation for a doctor to
examine a patient, prepare a report, and testify in court. This low
compensation provides little incentive for doctors to offer their
74. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.370 (West Supp. 1991).
Section 71.05.370 provides in pertinent part:
Insofar as danger to the individual or others is not created, each person
involuntarily detained, treated in a less restrictive alternative course of
treatment or committed for treatment and evaluation pursuant to this
chapter shall have, in addition to other rights not specifically witheld by
law, the following rights, a list of which shall be prominently posted in
all facilities, institutions, and hospitals providing such services:
(7) Not to consent to the performance of shock treatment, the
administration of antipsychotic medications, or surgery, except
emergency life-saving surgery, and not to have shock treatment,
antipsychotic medications, or nonemergency surgery in such
circumstance unless ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction
pursuant to the following standards and procedures...
(c) The person shall be present at any hearing on a request to administer
shock treatment or antipsychotic medications filed pursuant to this
subsection. The person has the right: (i) To be represented by an
attorney; (ii) to present evidence; '(iii) to cross-examine witnesses; (iv)
to have the rules of evidence enforced; (v) to remain silent; (vi) to view
and copy all petitions and reports in the court file; and (vii) to be given
reasonable notice and an opportunity to prepare for the hearing. The
court may appoint a psychiatrist, psychologist within their scope of
practice, or physician to examine and testify on behalf of such person.
The court shall appoint a psychiatrist, psychologist within their scope of
practice, or physician designated by such person or the person in cases
where an order for shock treatment is sought.
Id. § 71.05.370(7)(c) (emphasis added).
75. Although empirical data is presently unavailable, the fact that this
issue has been raised by counsel representing indigent civil committees
seemingly suggests that psychiatrists are reluctant to serve on the section 35
panel. See, e.g., Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
76. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991); supra note 46.
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services as section 35 expert witnesses. 77
C. The Immense Impact of Medical Testimony on the Court
Renders Availability of Independent PsychiatricAssistance
Indispensable
Although New York courts have been sensitive to Rivers, by
allowing counsel to be present during different stages of
administrative proceedings before the final hearing, 78 the patient
still lacks the opportunity to meet with an independent
psychiatrist who can aid the patient and his attorney in preparing
a meaningful defense. The patient is, therefore, unable to rebut
testimony of the facility's psychiatrist, conduct an effective cross
examination, or offer favorable testimony during his case in
chief. 79 Although the patient will attempt to enumerate favorable
77. See In re Machuca, 113 Misc. 2d 1044, 451 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1982). In Machuca, the court recognized that section 35 does
not provide sufficient compensation for expert witnesses. Id. at 1047-48, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 340-41. More specifically, Judge Spatt stated:
Parenthetically, the Court wishes to note that even in the "ordinary
cause," the limited funds now available by statute with which to fund
court-appointed psychiatrists and other medical witnesses is inadequate.
This became clearly evident during the period that this Court presided at
hearings at Pilgrim State Hospital with regard to applications to retain
or release civilly committed patients and applications for authorization
to perform surgical procedures.
Id. at 1047-48, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
78. See Ughetto v. Acrish, 130 A.D.2d 12, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398 (2d Dep't
1987) (involuntarily committed patient has a right to have counsel present
during psychiatric examination); In re Lesser, 144 Misc. 2d 359, 544
N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1989) (requiring a patient's counsel to
be present during final administrative review); Lesser v. Carmela,
146 Misc. 2d 1072, 554 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1989)
(involuntarily committed patient has a right to be represented at the initial
review of request for the administration of antipsychotic medication); see also
Savastano v. Nurnberg, 152 A.D.2d 290, 293, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (2d
Dep't 1989) ("Mental Hygiene Law § 9.01 contemplates that the patient's
constitutional rights will be protected by provisions for judicial review at
various stages of the patient's hospitalization."), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 300, 569
N.E.2d 421, 567 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1990).
79. See Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97,
157 (1984) ("Qualified clinical experts can 'enable defendants to explore and
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facts and draw conclusions about his own psychological condition, the court's decision is usually based on expert opinion. 80
"Judges have routinely deferred to the psychiatrist's expert testimony, abdicating their decisional role to the medical professional, even when their intuitions tell them that the professional's
testimony is highly inaccurate." ' 8 1 Cases have also been reported
where judges have blindly deferred to psychiatric opinion. 82 One
author states that "many attorneys accept psychiatric judgments at
face value, possibly because they feel incapable of challenging
such judgments." ' 83 One California hearing examiner reported
that "[i]n many hearings, the only evidence of mental disorder
was the doctor's diagnosis at the time the patient was admitted to
the facility." ' 84 The report disclosed that "because the patient
present subjective defenses and assist triers of fact to assess the plausibility and
significance of such claims."') (citation omitted).
80. See Reformed Commitment, supra note 31, at 663 ("The significance
of the failure of judge and counsel to elicit a preponderance of the evidence for
imminent danger is that, in the absence of testimony, the court is unable to
reach a decision independent of the psychiatrist's recommendation."); see also
Hiday, Judicial Decisions in Civil Commitment: Fads, Attitudes, and
PsychiatricRecommendation, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 517, 526-27 (1983).
81. Kaufman, "Crazy" Until Proven Innocent? Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 333, 362 (1988).

Judges and lawyers, lacking knowledge of mental illness and psychiatry,
frequently defer to expert medical opinion, allowing the psychiatrist to
become, in effect, the decision maker. See Reformed Commitment, supra, note
31, at 655. An Arizona study showed such deference in more than 96% of all
cases. Id. Other studies have shown 100% agreement between medical reports
and court decisions. Id. In addition, it has been stated that "[w]here neither
counsel nor judge questions conclusory psychiatric labels, commitment
hearings are superficial and brief." Id. Likewise, "[ilnformal conversations
with judges and attorneys suggest that they defer to psychiatric opinion
because they feel they lack the requisite expertise and want to obtain help for
those in need." Id. at 665. See also Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 97 (1984). Slobogin also suggests that "when expert
predictive testimony is the evidence in question, judges usually are swayed by
it, despite the fact that it is often wrong." Id. at 147.
82. See Reformed Commitment, supra note 31, at 664 ("[j]udge: They
[psychiatrists] have ways of knowing - tests and tricks not known to us").
83. See Wexler, supra note 49, at 745.
84. Morris, Civil Commitment Decisionmaking: A Report on One
Decisionmaker'sExperience, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 291, 311 (1988).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/5

20

Speiser: Treatment Hearings

1991]

TREATMENT HEARINGS

advocate lacked the ability to obtain an independent psychiatric
evaluation, the facility's assertion of mental disorder went unchallenged in all but one case." 8 5 The hearing examiner admitted
that this type of evidence often influenced his judgment.8 6
Furthermore, "psychiatric terminology often conveys misleading
information, which is usually prejudicial to the prospective patient."' 87 The magnitude of reliance by the court on medical testimony, coupled with "the propensity of psychiatrists to overpredict dangerousness," 88 often leads to commitment and/or forcible
medication without any real chance to prove that the allegations
of incompetence or dangerousness are incorrect. 89 Beyond this,

one author noted that the prediction of a patient's future dangerousness is not necessarily within the realm of expertise of a psychiatrist. 90
85. Id.
86. Id. at 312.
87. Wexler, supranote 49, at 744.
88. Reformed Commitment, supra note 31, at 654. "Physicians are
socialized to be cautious .... They operate on the theory that it is best to treat
when in doubt." Id. Furthermore, "[tlhere is a greater willingness to choose a
false positive - to treat a nonsick individual - than a false negative - to allow

a sick person [to] go untreated." Id.
89. See Kaufman, "Crazy" Until Proven Innocent? Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill Homeless, 19 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 333 (1987).

Kaufman noted that studies have shown that psychiatrists "overpredict"
dangerousness for the following reasons:
[A] miscalculation resulting in violence invites professional and litigious
charges of incompetence; the label "dangerous" may be the only way to
commit someone whom the psychiatrist feels generally needs treatment;
predictions consistently appear accurate since the detained individual is
not a threat to society and, once released, is considered nonviolent; and
a mistake in favor of confinement is more likely to be accepted by other
professionals. In addition, mental health professionals are predisposed
to provide mental health care and are less inclined to safeguard liberty
rights, particularly when those professionals are trainees.
Id. at 361 (footnotes omitted).
90. See Dix, Mental Health Professionals in the Legal Process: Some
Problems of Psychiatric Dominance, 6 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY 1, 4 (1981)
("Unfortunately, courts have tended to uncritically assume that prediction of
behavior, especially assaultive actions, is inherently related to mental health
expertise, and, consequently, that qualification of a witness as an expert in
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Due to the mental health experts' pivotal role in the outcome of
involuntary treatment hearings, 9 1 the lack of access to an independent psychiatrist can mean deprivation of the civil committee's due process rights and liberty interests through denial of the
right to prepare an effective defense. The disadvantage experienced here by the civil committee is absolutely unheard of and
inconsistent with our adversarial system. 92 The American forum
is not built to operate in this manner. 93 Our judicial system is
premised on the expectation that every person against whom allegations are made need not withstand such an imbalance of power

diagnosing and treating mental disorders also qualifies that person as an expert
in predicting behavior."); see also Wexler, supra note 49, at 744 ("[E]ven
though descriptive statements about behavior are assumed to be objective, too
often they are based in substantial part on subjective judgment and
opinions.").
91. See Bank & Poythress, The Elements of Persuasion in Expert
Testimony, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 173 (1982). Persuasiveness of the
mental health expert has a significant impact on the trier of fact. Id. at 174.
Factors such as the expert's trustworthiness, dynamism, and expertise all lend
to the credibility of each mental health expert. Id. at 175-78. See also Farrell,
supra note 37, at 174. Moreover, Farrell believes that an expert's opinion can
be a conclusive factor in the final determination because:
No careful judge is likely to assume the responsibility of allowing an
alleged insane person to go free when the sole expert opinion in the
record advises him that such a course is dangerous . .

.

.Yet no judge

would be justified in using his own amateur judgment in classifying a
paranoiac as a mild case, against the opinion of psychiatrists who were
holding him in custody, unless he were supported by the opinion of
some independent expert.
Id. at 151 (quoting De Marcos v. Overholser, 137 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir.)),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 785 (1943).
92. Farrell stated that a major cause of this deprivation "is that the
allegedly mentally ill person is denied access to the weapons for mounting such
an attack, unless he has thefunds to procure them himself." Farrell supra note
37, at 181 (emphasis added). Farrell further suggests that "[t]he civil
commitment process may cause deprivations of liberty even more extensive
than those possible in the criminal justice system." Id.
93. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the
Supreme Court unequivocally held that federal due process prohibits a state
from denying indigents access to the judicial system solely because of their
inability to pay court costs and fees. Id. at 383.
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and disadvantage in the courtroom. 94 As can be seen, the due
process provision of the New York State Constitution 95 is simply
not being maintained during forcible medication hearings since
the indigent patient has no access to an independent psychiatrist.
II. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN PROVIDING
INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE
TO THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
A. Ake v. Oklahoma: The Realization of Economic Disparity
Resulting in the Denial of Due Process Rights
In 1979, the Supreme Court acknowledged the particularly
delicate situation of the potential civil involuntary committee. 96
In Addington v. Texas, 97 the Supreme Court noted that "[it] repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
process protection.", 98 To further this end, the Court required a
heightened standard of proof in determining whether a patient is
dangerous ina civil commitment proceeding. 99 The Court stated
that this higher standard should be used to avert "the possible
risk that a factfinder might decide to commit an individual based
solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct."1100 The
Court further concluded that "[i]ncreasing the burden of proof is
one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps [ reduce the chances that inappropri94. Id. at 375 ("Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of
his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's

monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said
to be acceptable under our scheme of things.").

95. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.").

96. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
97. Id.

98. Id.at 425.
99. Id. at 426.
100. Id. at 427.
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ate commitments will be ordered." 10 1
In 1985, the due process concern expressed in Addington was
reflected in a United States Supreme Court decision regarding the
criminal involuntary committee. 10 2 In Ake v. Oklahoma,10 3 the
Supreme Court acknowledged the special need for psychiatric assistance in the preparation of an insanity defense. 104 The Court
recognized the fact that mere access to the courthouse does not
insure a fair adversarial proceeding. 105 The Court reasoned that
"a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds
against an indigent defendant without making certain that he has
access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective
defense." 1° 6 Indigent defendants must receive "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system." 107 The Court focused on providing tools to the indigent
defendant in order to present an adequate defense. 108 In particular, the Court recognized that a psychiatrist is needed to aid a defense attorney in interpreting answers given by his adversary's
expert witness, ascertaining what questions to ask the state's
101. Id. Although the Court was addressing the issue of involuntary
commitment, the same rationale should be applied to forcible medication, as
the concern at a Rivers hearing is heightened because the patient may be forced
to ingest medication that has potential heinous and irreversible side effects. See
supra, notes 42-44 and accompanying text. In a civil commitment proceeding,
one is in danger of losing his freedom. Therefore, the court seeks to protect
the patient's due process rights. Similarly, as seen in Rivers, courts are
concerned with the due process rights of an indigent civil committee who is in
danger of being forcibly medicated. See supra note 78. Because the Court in
Addington sought to avert inappropriate commitments to protect due process
rights, it must be the case that they would also seek to avert inappropriate,
forced treatment which is potentially a more invasive violation of one's due
process and liberty interests.
102. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 83. The Court held that when a defendant's sanity is a
significant factor, the state must provide the defendant a psychiatrist to assist
in the preparation of the defense. Id.
105. Id. at 77.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
108. Id.
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physician expert witness, and identifying "'elusive and often deceptive' symptoms of insanity." 109 The Court held that the state
must provide an indigent criminal defendant access to a psychiatrist for preparation and presentation of his defense. 110 "[Justice
cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a
judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. "111 The
Court explained that without such assistance, a defendant's case
may be devastated. 112 "W~e recognize today. . . that when the
state has made the defendant's mental condition relevant to...
the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist
may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshall his defense."113 On the other hand, if such assistance is provided, the
defendant may have a reasonable chance of success. 114 Thus, at
least the United States Supreme Court has recognized the criminal defendant's need for an independent psychiatrist in constructing a meaningful defense. Therefore, when the defendant's sanity
is a significant factor at trial, "the State must, at a minimum,
assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,
preparation,andpresentationof the defense." 15
The inability of an indigent criminal defendant to present an ef109. Id. at 80 (quoting Solesbee v. Balkeom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950)).

110. Id. at 83. The Court reasoned that "without the assistance of a
psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination . . . and to assist in

preparing the cross examination of a State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of
an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely high." Id.
111. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). The Court further stated that "when a
State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair
opportunity to present his defense." Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 83. "It is in such cases that a defense may be devastated by the
absence of a psychiatric examination and testimony; with such assistance, the
defendant might have a reasonable chance of success." Id. (emphasis added).

113. Id. at 80 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court noted that "[t]he
risk of error from denial of such assistance as well as its probable value, is

most predictably at its height when the defendant's mental condition is
seriously in question." Id. at 82.

114. See id. at 83.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
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fective insanity defense, via denial of expert psychiatric assistance, creates an inequality between the indigent criminal defendant and the non-indigent defendant. Such failure to apply equal
protection of the laws is prohibited by the United States
117
Constitution, 116 as well as by respective state constitutions.
The imbalance created by an indigent's poverty prevents that
indigent from developing an effective defense, thus his due process rights are violated. 118
Even prior to Ake, lower federal courts recognized this economic disparity. In United States v. Theriault,119 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that pursuant to
the 1964 Criminal Justice Act 120 an indigent federal prisoner was
entitled to have access to a psychiatric expert at the government's
expense to assist in his defense. 12 1 In his concurring opinion,
Judge Wisdom construed the 1964 Criminal Justice Act as
requiring authorization for expert services in cases where an
attorney representing an indigent criminal defendant reasonably
believes that he would otherwise acquire an expert for a client
116. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities . . . nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
117. E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.").
118. See Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and
InvestigationalAssistance in CriminalProceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 632,
641 (1970) [hereinafter Adequate Defense] ("[lack of funds could in reality
prevent an indigent defendant from offering a defense").
119. 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1971).
120. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988). Section
3006A(e)(1) provides:
UPON REQUEST.-Counsel for a person who is financially unable to
obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate
representation may request them in an ex parte application. Upon
finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the
services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain
them, the court or the United States magistrate if the services are
required in connection with a matter over which he has jurisdiction,
shall authorize counsel to obtain the services.

Id. § 3006A(e)(1).
121. Theriault, 440 F.2d at 715-17.
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who has the financial means to fund a meaningful defense. 12
Furthermore, the United States District Court, Eastern District of
New York, in Edny v. Smith, 123 wrote that denial of such

assistance also violates a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to effective counsel. 124 One writer believes that while
"[t]he sixth amendment does not demand a favorably conclusive
defense for the indigent, [] effective assistance does require that
each defense in the defendant's favor should be sought out,
efficiently prepared, and adequately presented." 125
Furthermore, federal courts have rejected court appointed neutral psychiatrists in criminal cases as sufficient to meet the needs
of a criminal defendant, just as this author rejects court appointed
neutral psychiatrists in the civil context. 126 In United States v.
Chavis,127 the court held that up to four psychiatrists appearing

for the government or the court did not constitute adequate expert
assistancefor the preparation of a defense for a criminal defendant.128 The court held that it was error to refuse the defen122. Id. at 717 (Wisdom, J., concurring). Judge Wisdom interpreted the
1964 Criminal Justice Act "as requiring authorization for defense services
when the attorney makes a reasonable request in circumstances in which he
would independently engage such services if his client had the financial means
to support his defenses." Id.
123. 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
124. Id. at 1048. The court stated that "[e]ffectiveness requires, among
other things, adequate trial preparation including resort to expert witnesses
where appropriate." Id.; see also Adequate Defense, supra note 118, at 632-33
(while the government need not alleviate one's poverty altogether, it should
not allow it to interfere with the administration ofjustice).
125. Adequate Defense, supra note 118, at 641.
126. See United States v. Reason, 549 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1977) (defendant
improperly denied the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in the preparation
of his defense of competency and criminal responsibility); United States v.
Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973) (appointment of an expert witness was
required by statute when an affidavit, filed in support of a motion for
appointment of a defense, sufficiently stated that the defendant exhibited
mental disorders); United States v. Chavis, 486 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(when insanity is the defendant's sole defense, the defendant is to be provided
with a psychiatrist of his own choice).
127. 486 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
128. Id. at 1292.
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9
dant's request for "only one psychiatrist of his own choice."'12
The appointment of neutral psychiatrists by the court to aid in its
determination simply does not obviate the need for expert assis13 1
tance for the defendant. 130 The court in United States v. Bass,
perceptively distinguished between a neutral court appointed expert and an independent expert retained to aid the defendant. The
court noted that an appointed expert is neutral, detached, and acts
as a reporter to the court.132 Conversely, the independent expert
gives trial and pre-trial assistance to the defendant. 133 An
independent psychiatrist affords the accused an opportunity for an
expert to assist him in his defense. 134
Other federal courts have also recognized the indispensable
need for an independent psychiatrist in the preparation of a
meaningful defense of insanity. 135 Such courts rely on the 1964
Criminal Justice Act, 136 which provides the criminal defendant
with an opportunity to request such an expert when services are
"necessary for an adequate defense . -137 If it is found, at an

129. Id. (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at 1291. The court reasoned that a 50 minute examination by a
court appointed psychiatrist, "with no opportunity to consult personally with
the defense attorney before trial, was hardly adequate psychiatric assistance by
any test." Id.; see also Bass, 477 F.2d at 725 (appointment of two experts to
investigate competency and sanity did not obviate defendant's right to an
expert under section 3006A(e)).
131. 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973).
132. Id. at 725-26.
133. Id. at 726.
134. See United States v. Reason, 549 F.2d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 1977)
(Section 3006A(e) "affords to an accused the reasonable opportunity to
procure the services of a psychiatrist to assist him in his defense . . ."
(emphasis in original).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970).
136. See supra note 120.
137. 18 U.S.C. 3006A(e) (1988). "The Criminal Justice Act of 1964...
was enacted to 'assure adequate representation in the Federal courts of accused
persons with insufficient means."' Proffit v. United States, 582 F.2d 854, 857
(4th Cir. 1978) (quoting S. REP. No. 346, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963)).
See also United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[T]he
purpose of § 3006A(e) of the Criminal Justice Act [is] to provide the accused
with a fair opportunity to prepare and present his case... ...
"); United States
v. Fogarty, 538 F. Supp. 856, 861 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) ("It seems obvious that
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ex parte hearing, that expert services are necessary to an adequate
defense and that the defendant is financially unable to retain
them, the Criminal Justice Act requires the court to authorize
counsel to obtain such services. 13 8 Courts have construed the
terms "necessary for an adequate defense" to include a criminal
defendant relying principally upon the defense of insanity who
seeks the help of an independent psychiatrist. 1 3 9 1n United States
v. Durant,140 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that the purpose of the Criminal Justice Act is "to
provide the accused with a fair opportunity to prepare and present
his case . .

"141 In United States v. Taylor,142 the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that "[tihe
expert services made available under that statute clearly

the Congressional purpose in adopting this statute was to seek to place indigent
defendants as nearly as may be on a level of equality with nonindigent
defendants in the defense of criminal cases.") (quoting United States v. Tate,
419 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1969)); 110 CONG. REc. 18521 (1964) ("An
adequate representation commonly entails more than the mere presence of a
lawyer.

.

.

.To prepare his defense he may need investigative, expert, or

other services ....These are accorded by the terms of the bill .... ").
138. See 18 U.S.C. 30006A(e); supra note 120.
139. See United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1973)
(appointment of a psychiatric expert was required because defendant's mental
history suggested that an insanity defense might be appropriate); United States
v. Chavis, 486 F.2d 1290, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (appointment of a
psychiatric expert was required because insanity was the defendant's sole
defense); Alvord y. Wainwright, 564 F. Supp. 459, 484 (M.D. Fla. 1983)
("[U]nder appropriate circumstances, a defendant must be provided a
psychiatric examination when such is necessary to a reasonable investigation of
an insanity defense."); Edny v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1048 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) ("Where, as here, insanity is the principal defense, access to psychiatric
experts is essential to assist the attorney in presenting an adequate case.").
140. 545 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1976).
141. Id. at 827. The court held that the district court erred in refusing to
grant the indigent criminal defendant's request for the appointment of a
fingerprint expert. Id. at 824. The court reasoned that "the purpose of the Act,
confirmed by it's legislative history, is clearly to redress the imbalance in the
criminal process when the resources of the United States Government are
pitted against an indigent defendant." Id. at 827.
142. 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971).
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comprehend psychiatric assistance." ' 143 The same goal was also
articulated in the legislative history of the Criminal Justice Act of
1964, which stated: "[riecognizing that defendants often did not
have the resources to obtain counsel or defense services, the act
provided compensation for appointed counsel and payment for
necessary expert and investigative services." 144 A letter written
by John F. Kennedy to the Congress stated the purpose of the
act:
To diminish the role which poverty plays in our Federal System
of criminal justice [,].

.

. to assure effective legal representation

for every man whose limited means would otherwise deprive him
of an adequate defense against criminal charges . . . [i]n the

typical criminal case [where] the resources of government are
pitted against those of the individual. To guarantee a fair trial
under such circumstances requires that each accused person have
ample opportunity to gather evidence, and prepare and present
his cause. Whenever the lack of money prevents a defendant
from securing an experienced lawyer, trained investigator or
145
technical expert, an unjust conviction may follow.
The key phrase in the statute is "an adequate defense." A defense is inadequate and unjust under those circumstances which
prevent a defendant from gathering evidence needed to properly
protect himself against charges made against him. 146 A criminal
defendant whose sanity is questioned, therefore, has at least a
"'minimwn . . . constitutional right to one psychiatric examination and opinion developed in a manner reasonably calculated to
allow adequate review . . . [and the] opportunity to utilize the
analysis in preparation and conduct of the defense."' 147 The
143. Id. at 377. The court concluded that the district court erred in denying

the indigent defendant expert psychiatric assistance so as to determine whether
an insanity defense may have existed. Id. at 373.
144. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 18, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3982, 3984.
145. President's Message to the Congress Transmitting for Consideration
the Criminal Justice Act (March 8, 1963), JOHN F. KENNEDY PUB. PAPERS
244-45 (1963).
146. See id.
147. Alvord v. Wainwright, 564 F. Supp. 459, 484 (M.D. Fla. 1983)

(emphasis in original) (quoting Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 787 (S.D.
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Fourth Circuit noted that the assistance of a psychiatrist is so
crucial that without it, a defense will only be successful in rare
cases where there is extreme sympathy for the defendant. 14 8 The
court reasoned that:
Consultation.

.

. [between counsel and a psychiatrist]attunes

the lay attorney to unfamiliar but central medical concepts and
enables him, as an initial matter, to assess the soundness and
advisabilityof offering the defense... [and][miost importantly,
to probe
it permits a lawyer inexpert in the science ofpsychiatry
14 9
intelligently thefoundations of adverse testimony.

The State of New York has likewise recognized the need for
a criminal defendant to obtain independent psychiatric assistance
in constructing an adequate defense when his mental capacity is
in issue. New York's article 18B of the County Law, section
722-c1 50 is very similar to section 3006A(e) of the Federal
Criminal Justice Act of 1964.151 The statute provides that when
"expert or other services are necessary and that the defendant is
financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize
counsel

.

.

. to obtain the services on behalf of the

152

A letter written by then Governor Nelson A.
defendant."
Rockefeller, on approval of the bill, points out that the right to a
fair trial is as indispensable as the right to counsel in our society
Ga. 1981)).

148. Taylor, 437 F.2d at 377 n.9.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. N.Y. CoUNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1991).
151. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3600A(e); supra note 120.

152. N.Y. CouNTY LAW § 722-c (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1991)
(emphasis added). Section 722-c provides in pertinent part:
Upon a finding in an ex parte proceeding that the defendant or other
person described in section two hundred forty-nine or section two
hundred sixty-two of the family court act or section four hundred seven
of the surrogate's court procedure act, is financially unable to obtain
them, the court shall authorize counsel, whether or not assigned in
accordance with a plan, to obtain the services on behalf of the defendant
or such other person. The court upon a finding that timely procurement
of necessary services could not await prior authorization may authorize
the services nunc pro tune.
Id. § 722-c (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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and "both must be protected if our system of justice under law is
to continue and flourish." 153 Governor Rockefeller construed this
statute as providing the "machinery for guaranteeing the true
exercise" of the undeniable right to counsel. 154 He believed that
New York had always been the leader in the protection of its
citizens rights and that this statute was simply one more step in
New York's grand scheme of common law and statutory
protection of liberty. 155
In 1978 the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division,
Second Department applied section 722-c, in People v.
Hatterson,15 6 and held that denial of a motion for a physician and
a psychiatrist at the city's expense "constituted an improvident
exercise of discretion.- 157 The Second Department reversed the
trial court which utilized testimony of an expert in psychotherapy
against the defendant, as it denied the defendant a similar opportunity to consult with a psychiatrist at the city's expense. 158
Similarly, in People v. Franco,159 the Supreme Court Appellate
Division, Second Department concluded that the trial court correctly granted an indigent criminal defendant's initial application
for a psychiatrist/expert witness at the county's expense. 160
More recently, in People v. Vale, 161 the Supreme Court
Appellate Division, First Department followed the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning articulated in Ake v. Oklahoma.162 In
Vale, the court held that a criminal defendant exercising an insanity defense was wrongly denied access to a psychiatrist in developing a defense.163 The court stated that such denial
153. Governor's Memoranda Approval of ch. 878, N.Y. Laws (July 16,
1985), reprinted in 1965 LEdIs. ANN. 524-25.
154. Id. at 525.
155. See id.
156. 63 A.D.2d 736, 405 N.Y.S.2d 297 (2d Dep't 1978).

157. Id. at 736, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
158. Id.

159. 120 A.D.2d 609, 502 N.Y.S.2d 82 (2d Dep't 1986).
160. Id. at 610, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83.

161. 133 A.D.2d 297, 519 N.Y.S.2d 4 (lst Dep't 1987).
162. Id. at 300, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 7. For a review of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Ake, see supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.
163. Vale, 133 A.D.2d at 299, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
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"[d]eprived [defendant] of all realistic opportunity to defend
himself effectively .

more." ' 164

.

..

The defendant was entitled to

The reasoning applied in Ake was thus adopted, as the

court noted:

[W]hen a State undertakes to prosecute an indigent defendant, it
must also take whatever measures are necessary to assure that
the defendant is able to participate meaningfully in the proceeding. The proceeding will otherwise be fundamentally unfair
and offensive to the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 165
B. Ake v. Oklahoma: Due ProcessRequiresAccess to an
Independent Psychiatristfor a CriminalDefendant Whose
Mental Capacity is in Issue
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." 166 In 1976, the Supreme Court, in
Mathews v. Eldidge,167 articulated a three part test to be applied
when deciding whether due process calls for procedural protections in any given situation. Courts should consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
164. Id. at 301, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 7-8. The court further added that
"[c]learly, in the interests of justice and fundamental fairness, he should have
been permitted access to the expert psychiatric assistance he needed in order to
present an adequate defense." Id.
165. Id. at 299, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 6-7 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 76 (1985)); see also People v. Evans, 141 Misc. 2d 781, 783, 534
N.Y.S.2d 640, 642 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1988) ("It is indisputable that
an indigent defendant is entitled to access to expert assistance at public
expense.").
166. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
167. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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procedural requirement would entail. 16 8
In 1985, the Supreme Court applied this test in Ake v.
Oklahoma,16 9 to determine "whether, and under what
conditions, the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough
to preparation of a defense to require the State to provide an indigent [criminal] defendant with access to competent psychiatric
assistance in preparing a defense. '"170 The Supreme Court considered part one of the test, the private interest, to be "uniquely
compelling. 171 It expressed a particular concern with the accuracy of a criminal proceeding "that places an individual's life or
liberty at risk . .

-172 This concern, the Court explained,

weighed heavily in their analysis. 173
In analyzing part two of the Mathews formula, the Court regarded the probable value of this particular procedural safeguard
as crucial. 174 "More than 40 States, as well as the Federal

Government, have decided either through legislation or judicial
decision that indigent defendants are entitled, under certain circumstances, to the assistance of a psychiatrist's expertise.' 175
The Court recognized the significant role that a psychiatrist plays
in creating and presenting a defense, as well as the many ways a
psychiatrist can assist the defendant and his attorney.176
168. Id.at 335.
169. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
170. Id.
at 77.
171. Id. at 78.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 79.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 80. The Court reasoned that:
In this role, psychiatrists gather facts, through professional examination,
interview6, and elsewhere, that they will share with the judge or jury;
they analyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible
conclusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about the
effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opinions about how
the defendant's mental condition might have affected his behavior at the
time in question. They know the probative questions to ask of the
opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers.
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"[W]here permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can translate medical diagnosis into language that will assist the trier of
fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that has meaning for
the task at hand." 177 The Court concluded that:
[W]ithout the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a
professional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to
help determine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present
testimony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a
State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolution
178
of sanity issues is extremely high.
The Court proceeded to trivialize the state's fiscal concern in
requiring this procedural safeguard. 179 The Court held that the
state's financial burden was simply not substantial enough to
preclude psychiatric assistance to an indigent criminal defendant
whose mental capacity was in issue.180 The Court listed a
number of states that have overcome the financial burden of
providing at least one psychiatrist for the indigent criminal,
mentally ill defendant. 181 The Court stated that "it is difficult to
identify any interest of the State, other than in its economy, that
weighs against recognition of this right" 182 but, concluded that
since the state also has an "interest in the fair and accurate
adjudication of criminal cases," 183 the government's interest in
denying the right to an independent psychiatrist is not
substantial. 184 The Court held that at a minimum, the state must
provide such a defendant with a competent psychiatrist "who win
conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,

177. Id.
178. Id. at 82.
179. See id. at78.

180. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
181. Id. at 78-79. The Court explained that "[m]any States, as well as the

Federal Government, currently make psychiatric assistance available to
indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial burden so great as
to preclude this assistance." Id. at 78.

182. Id. at 79.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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185
preparation, and presentation of the defense.,,
This is precisely the reasoning that must be applied to the
186 Just
civilly committed patient in danger of forced medication.

185. Id. at 83.
186. But see Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In
Goetz, the Southern District of New York applied the three part test first
articulated in Mathews, concerning the appointment of independent psychiatric
assistance at commitment hearings, and held that federal due process standards
are not violated when the court refuses to appoint such an expert witness at a
civil commitment hearing. Id. at 135-37. However, the holding in Goetz is
inapplicable to the civilly committed patient in danger of being forcibly
medicated for three reasons. First, the Goetz case involved civil commitment
hearings where physical liberty is at stake as opposed to bodily autonomy and
the potential danger of irreversible side effects. id. at 133-34. Second, the
Goetz court relied, in part, on the proposition that the New York State
Legislature has attempted to insure that "committed persons may be released
after the briefest time in confinement." Id. at 135. (quoting Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986)). However, the legislature has not provided for
mandatory review of a forcible medication order. Therefore, an involuntarily
committed patient could be forcibly medicated for a longer period of time than
necessary. See In re McConnell, 147 A.D.2d 881, 882, 538 N.Y.S.2d 101,
103 (3d Dep't 1989) ("Respondent expresses a very legitimate concern over
the absence of any time limit or mandatory review of the forced medications
being allowed."). Third, Goetz was decided on federal due process grounds.
Goetz, 769 F. Supp. at 137. This Comment focuses on state constitutional
rights and privileges with respect to the indigent civilly committed patient. As
such, it must be noted that in New York "[a]lthough State courts may not
circumscribe rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they may interpret
their own law to supplement or expand them." People v. P.J. Video Inc., 68
N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). Further, New York has "frequently applied the
State Constitution, in both civil and criminal matters, to define a broader scope
of protection than that accorded by the Federal Constitution in cases
concerning individual rights and liberties." Id. at 303, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 912. In his concurring opinion in Beach v. Shanley, 62 N.Y.2d
241, 465 N.E.2d 304, 476 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1984), then Judge Wachtler stated,
"that the Federal Constitution only guarantees minimum protections, leaving
to the States the task of affording additional or greater rights under their
Constitutions, tailored to the special needs and traditions of the various
States." Id. at 255, 465 N.E.2d at 312, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 773 (Wachtler, J.,
concurring). Finally, two years later Chief Justice Wachtler, writing for the
majority, stated that "[t]he function of the comparable provisions of the State
Constitution, .

.

. is to supplement those rights to meet the needs and

expectations of the particular State." People v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d
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as the Supreme Court reasoned in Ake v. Oklahoma that a criminal defendant's private interest is uniquely compelling because
the outcome of the judicial proceeding may put defendant's life
or liberty at risk, 187 so too, the determination made at an invol-

untary treatment hearing may put the patient's life or liberty at
risk. Rivers v. Katz distinctly established the fact that a patient
has a liberty interest in deciding whether or not to be medicated.188 The interest of the mentally ill patient is at least as
great, if not greater, (because of the irreversibility and severity of
common side effects of many commonly used drugs), than the
criminal defendant's interest in the outcome of a judicial proceeding. 189 Just as the Supreme Court in Ake reasoned that the state's
financial burden is minimal as compared to the significant personal interest at stake in a criminal proceeding, 190 this reasoning
is equally compelling with regard to the personal interest at stake
in an involuntary treatment proceeding. 19 1
As the Ake Court opined, all that is needed is one psychiatrist
to aid the defendant (here, the patient) in creating and presenting

553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986).

187. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
188. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d
74, 79-80 (1986). The court further stated that, "[w]e likewise reject any
argument that involuntarily committed patients lose their liberty interest in
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication." Id. at 495,
495 N.E.2d at 342-43, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
189. But see Goetz, 769 F. Supp. at 134-35. The Goetz court refused to

recognize that a patient in danger of civil commitment had a liberty interest
equivalent to that of a criminal defendant. Id. at 135-37. Notwithstanding the
Goetz determination, it is this author's position that the civil committee in
danger of forced treatment must have a "uniquely compelling" interest since
the patient will most likely suffer discomfort and pain, as well as possible
irreversible side effects. See supranotes 42-44 and accompanying text.

190. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79.
191. Cf. Goetz, 769 F. Supp. at 135-36. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim
that federal due process mandated the appointment of an independent

psychiatrist at a civil commitment hearing, the court acknowledged that state
fiscal concerns are insufficient to overcome the grave personal interest at stake.

Id. at 136. However, the court failed to identify another existing state interest
that would be strong enough to overcome the personal interest involved.
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a meaningful defense. 192 Likewise, just as the state has an interest in a fair and accurate criminal adjudication, its interest is escalated in a forced medication proceeding. 193 As the state has an
interest in the justness of its adjudicatory system, 194 the state
equally has an interest in the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. 195 Therefore, the state's interest manifests in the accuracy
of an involuntary treatment hearing, rather than in its fiscal concerns.
192. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. However, the Goetz court believed that such
assistance could create an ethical dilemma for the independent psychiatrist in
determining whether allegiance lies with the patient or the attorney "who
wants to 'win' the case." Goetz, 769 F. Supp. at 136. The court distinguished
this ethical dilemma from that of an appointed attorney in a criminal
proceeding who must defend his client zealously even if he or she believes that
the client is guilty because, the court summarily opined, that the criminal
defendant is "obviously ... better served if he is not incarcerated." Id. On
the contrary, this distinction is not so clear. The appointed criminal defense
attorney must focus on creating the best defense possible for the defendant so
that when all the evidence is presented, the neutral factfinder can base the
decision on all available evidence, rather than soley on the state's evidence.
Furthermore, appointment of such an expert is not to obtain a favorable
diagnosis, but to aid the defense attorney in understanding and interpreting the
state psychologist's analysis and conclusions, thereby allowing the neutral
factfinders to properly execute their duty. Finally, if a criminal defendant is
"better served if he is not incarcerated," then the logical assumption that
follows must be that rehabilitation and deterrence play little, if any, role in the
American Judicial System.
193. The state's interest in an involuntary treatment proceeding is greater
than that in a civil commitment hearing because, unlike the various levels of
protection for the potential civil committee in the New York Mental Hygiene
Law, the involuntary treatment hearing stands alone as the protection against
unwanted medical treatment. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.27-.31
(McKinney 1988).
194. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) ("[T]he
judicial proceeding becomes the only effective means of resolving the dispute
at hand and denial of a defendant's full access to that process raises grave
problems for its legitimacy.").
195. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) ("The state has a
legitimate interest under its parenspatriaepowers providing care to its citizens
who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves . . .
[and] under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous
tendencies of some who are mentally ill."); see also supra notes 20-28 and
accompanying text.
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At least one court has acknowledged the fact that due process
may require the appointment of an independent expert psychiatrist to aid an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient in danger of forced medication in the preparation of an effective defense. 196 In Sanders v. New Mexico Health and Environment
Department, an involuntarily committed patient was appointed an
independent mental health professional to testify on his behalf at
a hearing to determine whether a "treatment guardianship"
should be terminated. 197 However, New Mexico law provided
for the appointment of psychiatric assistance only to aid the court
in determining whether the patient was competent to make reasoned decisions regarding medical treatment. 19 8
196. See Sanders v. New Mexico Health and Env't Dept, 108 N.M. 434,
773 P.2d 1241 (Ct. App. 1989).
197. Id. at 435, 773 P.2d at 1242. In Sanders, the patient had been found
incompetent to stand trial and was admitted to the Forensic Treatment Unit at
the Las Vegas Medical Center. Id. Following a hearing, an order appointing a
"treatment guardian" was entered. Id. The patient then moved to terminate the
treatment guardianship, claiming that he was competent to make his own
treatment decisions and requested an evaluation by an independent mental
health expert. Id.
198. See N.M. SCRA § 11-706(A) (1986). Section 11-706(A) provides:
Appointment. The judge may on his own motion or on the motion of
any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not
be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The
judge may appoint one or more expert witnesses of his own selection to
give evidence in the action except that, if the parties agree as to the
experts to be appointed, he shall appoint only those designated in the
agreement. An expert witness shall not be appointed by thejudge unless
he consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of his
duties by the judge in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the
clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to
participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of his
findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and he may
be called to testify by the judge or any party. He shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling him as a
witness.
Id. § 11-706(A) (emphasis in original). The New Mexico Court of Appeals
examined the statute and concluded that "[t]he above rule authorizes the trial
court to appoint an independent expert unaligned with either party to assist the
court in determining significant issues in the proceeding." Sanders, 108 N.M.
at 439-40, 773 P.2d at 1246-47.
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Notwithstanding the language of the statute, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals expressly recognized that although independent
psychiatric assistance was not provided for in the statute, such
assistance may indeed be a necessity if due process is to be protected. 199 "We agree that the statute does not expressly provide
for judicial appointment of an expert to assist petitioner...
[nievertheless, the constitutionalright of due process may require
appointmentfor an indigent in certain circumstances ....- 200
Most importantly, the court found authority for their proposition
in Ake v. Oklahoma.20 1 Consequently, this court has made the
critical connection between the criminal defendant in need of
expert assistance to present an adequate defense when sanity is at
issue and the involuntary civil committee in need of an
independent expert in order to prepare a meaningful defense to
20 2
the state's allegations of incompetency.
Beyond this, the court ordered that the expert witness be compensated with court funds. 20 3 By recognizing the vulnerability of
indigent involuntarily committed patients' due process rights, the
need for independent expert assistance in "certain circumstances," ' 204 and by supporting these propositions with the Ake
decision, it is clear that at least one state has contemplated the
need to extend the Ake reasoning into the civil arena when an
indigent involuntarily committed patient is in danger of being
forcibly medicated.

199. Sanders, 108 N.M. at 439-40, 773 P.2d at 1246-47.
200. Id. at 439, 773 P.2d at 1246 (emphasis added).

201. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 169-85.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 440, 773 P.2d at 1247.
204. Id. at 439, 773 P.2d at 1246.
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III. THE QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF
INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT HEARINGS
NECESSITATES INDEPENDENT
PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE
The due process protection extended to a criminal defendant
whose mental capacity is in issue should be extended to a civil
committee in danger of being forcibly medicated because the patient's mental capacity is also in issue. The judicial proceedings
afforded to both the criminal defendant and the civil committee
are quite similar and, therefore, a Rivers hearing to determine
mental capacity should be labeled quasi-criminal in nature. For
example, the due process concerns in both proceedings are virtually the same, and in some ways, much more troublesome for
the potential involuntary committee. This is because both the civil
committee and the criminal defendant are in danger of losing liberties. 205 However, beyond this loss of physical liberty, the civil
committee who is forcibly medicated is in danger of suffering irreversible harm caused by the side effects of the unwanted treatment. 206
In addition, the indigent civil committee has certain inalienable
2 08
due process rights, 20 7 as does the indigent criminal defendant.
The involuntarily committed patient in danger of forced treatment
205. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty).
206. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
207. See Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 494, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (1986) ("[n]or does the fact of mental illness result in the
forfeiture of a person's civil rights . . ."); Savastano v. Nurnberg, 152
A.D.2d 290, 299, 548 N.Y.S.2d 555, 560 (2d Dep't 1989) (indigent civil
committees have liberty interests subject to federal and state due process
protection), aff'd, 77 N.Y.2d 300, 569 N.E.2d 421, 567 N.Y.S.2d 618

(1990).
208. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) ("[Ihe Fourteenth
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the
belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.").
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is afforded a judicial proceeding, in accordance with due process
rights, to determine the validity of allegations made by the
state. 209 During the judicial proceeding, the civil committee is
afforded the opportunity to defend against allegations made by
the state. 2 10 Furthermore, both the civil committee and the
criminal defendant are provided with an attorney, if indigent, to
try to ensure effective representation.2 11 While it is true that the
criminal defendant's confinement is punitive in nature and the
civil committee's proposed treatment plan is allegedly
"rehabilitative," 212 the ultimate violation of liberty is still present.
However, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division,
Second Department held, in Ughetto v. Acrish,2 13 that the involuntarily committed patient has no fifth amendment rights against
self-incrimination during prehearing interviews. 2 14 The court
stated that it would be "inflexible to suggest that since confinement to a State mental hospital is a form of imprisonment, all
protections afforded by the bill of rights to a criminal defendant
must, as a matter of due process, be likewise afforded to a person
thought to be dangerously mentally ill. ' ' 2 15 The court reasoned
that since civil confinement is not punitive in nature, the allegedly mentally ill person has no fifth amendment right to remain silent at a prehearing psychiatric interview. 2 16 The court
209. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at
79.

210. See id.
211. It is well established that an indigent defendant in a criminal
prosecution has the right to have counsel appointed for him. See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Similarly, the indigent civil committee who
is in danger of being forcibly medicated is provided with legal assistance in
accordance with due process rights enumerated in the New York 9tate

Constitution. See Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d
at 81.
212. Ughetto v. Acrish, 130 A.D.2d 12, 19, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402 (2d
Dep't 1987) (quoting In re Gregory, 19 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 224 N.E.2d 102, 106,
277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 680 (1966)).
213. 130 A.D.2d 12, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398 (2d Dep't 1987).
214. Id. at 21, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.

215. Id. at 19, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
216. Id. at 20-21, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
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further stated that, "the overall purpose of the proceedingfl, including the prehearing interview, is to ensure that patients receive
the care and treatment that is necessary based upon their condition .... "217 This statement is of particular concern' for
two reasons. First, the proceeding that this statement focuses
upon is a commitment hearing. 218 The proceeding presently
being discussed is an involuntary treatment hearing, which
supersedes a commitment hearing. Second, the court assumes that
treatment is in fact "necessary based upon [the committee's]
condition ...
-219 The court assumes that simple confinement
invariably leads to the need for medication, even if such
treatment is contrary to a patient's wishes. This assumption flies
directly in the face of established New York common law.2 0 In
Rivers, the New York Court of Appeals held, on no uncertain
terms, that "neither the fact that

.

. [patients] are mentally ill

nor that they have been involuntarily committed, without more,
constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that they lack the mental
capacity to comprehend the consequences of their decision to
refuse medication ....-221 The determination of whether a civil
committee has the capacity to make a treatment decision must be
determined at a hearing before drugs may be administered.222
Furthermore, the state bears the burden of demonstrating the
patient's incapacity to make a treatment decision, by clear and
convincing evidence. 223 The Ughetto court concerned itself
solely with the lack of punitive nature of the civil commitment
217. Id. at 20, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403 (emphasis added).

218. Id. at 18, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
219. Id. at 20, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.

220. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).

221. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 494, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d
74, 79 (1986).
222. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81. The court stated
that "[w]e reject any argument that the mere fact that appellants are mentally
ill reduces in any manner their fundamental liberty interest to reject
antipsychotic medication." Id. at 495, 495 N.E.2d at 342, 504 N.Y.S.2d at

79-80.
223. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
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hearing, thereby ruling out certain due process protections. 224
The court determined that a patient's statements at pre-hearing
interviews are not admitted "against" him at a commitment
hearing, as a criminal's statements are admitted "against" him in
a criminal trial. 225 The court stated that, "the mere fact that
statements adduced during the interview will be used at a
hearing, which may result in confinement and a deprivation of
liberty, will not suffice to convert the nature of the proceeding
from civil to criminal. "226 This court, therefore, did not construe

confinement to a mental institution as punitive. 227 However, it
must be questioned whether this court or others would reach the
same conclusion regarding involuntary medication -- a much
more personal invasion and deprivation of liberty. 22 8 This
author, at least, considers the determination of incompetency or
dangerousness, without a fair and impartial hearing, to be an
egregious punishment, especially when one considers that the
victim may suffer irreversible harm by side effects produced by

the most commonly used antipsychotic medication. 2 29 There can
30
be no harsher punishment. 2

224. See Ughetto, 130 A.D.2d at 18-21, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03.
225. Id. at 21, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
226. Id. at 20, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
227. See id.
228. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In his concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Burger stated:
The quid pro quo theory is a sharp departure from, and cannot coexist
with, due process principles. As an initial matter, the theory
presupposes that essentially the same interests are involved in every
situation where a State seeks to confine an individual; that assumption,
however, is incorrect. It is elementary that the justification for the
criminal process and the unique deprivation of liberty which it can
impose requires that it be invoked only for commission of a specific
offense prohibited by legislative enactment.
Id. at 586 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
229. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text; see also Farrell, supra
note 37, at 177-78 (labeling a patient "incompetent" negatively effects selfperception as well as the perception by others -- including physicians).
230. But see Goetz v. Crosson, 769 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In
refusing plaintiff's request for the aid of an independent expert witness at a
commitment hearing, the court relied, in part, on the distinction between the
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Regardless, the holding and dictum of the Ughetto court, challenged here, applied only to the issue of the fifth amendment
right against self incrimination during pre-commitment interviews. 2 31 Alternatively, this author is arguing that New York
State due process rights emanating from article I section 6232
should be adequately protected. 233 Despite the Ughetto court's
faulty reasoning, the court did acknowledge that the involuntary
patient does, indeed, have due process rights. 23 4 The court relied
upon In re Gregoy 23 5 to assert that "[a]ny commitment whether civil or criminal, whether assertively for punitive or rehabilitative purposes -- involves a grave interference with personal liberty." ' 2 36 The court stated in dictum that "there is no
essential distinction to be made between the confinement which
often follows as a consequence of one's having been convicted of
a serious crime, and the confinement which follows as a conse-

quence of one's having been found to be mentally ill and dangerpunitive nature of a criminal proceeding and the rehabilitative nature of a civil
commitment proceeding. Id. at 135. However, reliance on this distinction
disregards the underlying purpose of the Supreme Court's decision in Ake to
provide expert psychiatric assistance to the indigent criminal defendant when
sanity is at issue. The purpose for such an appointment is not solely the
punitive nature of the criminal proceeding, but the due process concerns in
allowing an appointed criminal attorney to present an effective defense. See
supra text accompanying notes 103-15.
231. See Ughetto, 130 A.D.2d at 21, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
232. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.").
233. See People v. P.J Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556,
560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) ("When... [state] courts interpret State
statutes or the State Constitution the decisions of these courts are conclusive if
not violative of Federal law."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
234. Ughetto, 130 A.D.2d at 24, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 405. The court stated
"[w]ere we not to find, however, that a statutory basis exists for allowing the
presence of counsel at preretention hearings, we would be prepared,
nonetheless, to conclude, as did Special Term, that it is required by due
process." Id. Furthermore, "[tihe courts have repeatedly commented on the
vagueness of the term due process and on the flexibility with which it is
applied." Id.
235. 19 N.Y.2d 55, 224 N.E.2d 102, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1966).
236. Ugheno, 130 A.D.2d at 19, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (quoting In re
Gregory, 19 N.Y.2d at 62, 224 N.E.2d at 106, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 680).
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OUS. '' 237 The court further acknowledged that, although differ-

ences do exist in the character and purpose of confinement, "the
degree of interference with personal liberty inherent in the confinement is essentially the same, whether the confinement be
classified as civil or criminal."2 38 Therefore, the court held that
in accordance with due process rights, the patient's counsel was
allowed to be present during a psychiatric examination taken in
preparation of a precommitment hearing. 239 "Permitting counsel
to observe at such examinations would serve to assist the plaintiff's attorneys in preparation for retention hearings and, thus,
enhance the reliability of such hearings as to the truth-finding
functions." 240 Furthermore, the court found that "the absence of
counsel from these prehearing examinations would substantially
impair the basic procedural right of the plaintiffs to cross-examine the State's expert psychiatrist." 24 1 Since the court was concerned with a patient's due process rights as well as his personal
liberties during a civil commitment hearing, this concern must be
heightened when an involuntary medication hearing is at issue.
Invasion of liberty by forcible medication, as mentioned previously, can only be considered one of the gravest violations of
2 42
personal liberty.

Other types of judicial proceedings have been labeled quasicriminal in nature, where a party's liberty interest was not identical to that of a criminal defendant and the relief was not punitive,
yet the party was afforded due process protection. 2 43 For exam237. Id. at 18, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 18-19, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (emphasis added). The court
reasoned that "[h]ere the... [involuntary committees] have, of course, been
subjected to involuntary confinement away from their homes, their families,
and their friends and have been deprived of their liberty .... [A]ctions of the
State must, therefore, be subjected to careful judicial review with respect to
constitutional requirements of due process." Id. at 18, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
239. Id. at 25, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
240. Id. at 24, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 405-06.
241. Id. at 25, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
242. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (disbarment
proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature); Hynes v. Hartman, 63 A.D.2d 1, 3,
406 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (1st Dep't 1978) (proceeding to punish for civil
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pie, paternity proceedings have been labeled quasi-criminal in
nature by the United States Supreme Court and New York State
courts. 2 4 4 In Little v. Streater,245 the Supreme Court applied the
three part test articulated in Mathews v. Eldgridge246 in determining that in accordance with due process rights, indigent putative
fathers must be provided with certain blood grouping tests, at the
state's expense, to aid in creating a defense at a paternity proceeding. 247 The Supreme

Court reasoned

that

since the

contempt is quasi-criminal in nature, therefore, it must be proven with
reasonable certainty that respondent failed to comply with court order); D'Elia
v. Philip, 57 A.D.2d 836, 836, 394 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51 (2d Dep't 1977)
(paternity proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature); Duerr v. Wittman, 5
A.D.2d 326, 330, 171 N.Y.S.2d 444, 448 (1st Dep't 1958) (Although a
filiation proceeding is not a prosecution for punishment of a crime, and the
proceeding has different procedural characteristics, such as a different standard
of proof, corroboration is not required, and the defense against double
jeopardy is unavailable, it is still a creature that is sui generis and "may be
properly denominated as quasi-criminal in nature."); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 597, 600, 246 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Fam. Ct. New
York County 1963) (property seizure proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 13 Misc. 2d 718, 719-20, 180 N.Y.S.2d 183,
185-86 (Special Sessions Ct. 1958) (Although a filiation proceeding is not a
prosecution for punishment of a crime and allegations need only be established
by clear and convincing evidence, it is a creature sui generis, therefore, it is a
civil proceeding which is quasi-criminal in nature.); In re Scro, 200 Misc. 2d
688, 691, 108 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (Kings County Ct. 1951) (police removal
case is quasi-criminal in nature since rights of the officer and his good name
are at stake and, consequently, hearsay evidence may not be admissible); but
see, e.g., Miller v. Gordon, 58 A.D.2d 1027, 1027, 397 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501
(4th Dep't 1977) (paternity proceeding is civil in nature, not quasi-criminal).
244. See Little v. Streater 452 U.S. 1, 10 (1981) ("Although the State
characterizes such proceedings as 'civil', they have quasi-criminal overtones.")
(citation omitted); D'Elia, 57 A.D.2d at 836, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 51
("Disclosure of the records of the Department of Social Services should be
allowed under circumstances such as these, where the proceeding is quasicriminal in nature."); Duerr, 5 A.D.2d at 330, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 448 ("Mhe
filiation proceeding . . . may be properly denominated as quasi-criminal,

or... 'special proceedings of a criminal nature."') (citation omitted).
245. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
246. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). For a review of the three part test set forth in
Mathews, see supra text accompanying note 168.
247. Little, 452 U.S. at 6-17.
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Connecticut statute labeled a proven putative father as "guilty"
and provided that punishment for non-compliance with a court
order for support is a term of imprisonment, the proceeding had
248
quasi-criminal overtones.
In addition, New York courts have also construed Person In
Need of Supervision (PINS) proceedings to be quasi-criminal in
nature even though the behavior of the respondent is not of a
criminal nature. 24 9 In In re Andrew,250 the court determined that
a PINS proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature since there is a
potential for governmental interference with the liberty of a
child. 25 1 The respondent's rights cannot be taken away "merely
because... [his] conduct is noncriminal . "...,252
A patient's liberty interests, as well as the state's interest in a
just and accurate determination, is at least as great as the interests
at stake in proceedings defined by state and federal courts as
quasi-criminal in nature. 25 3 Although the patient in danger of
forced medication is not found "guilty" and punished by a term
of imprisonment, in the event the patient is found "incompetent"
at the Rivers hearing and forcibly medicated, it is possible that
the patient's liberty interests are violated by the administration of
the unwanted treatment. New York courts have been clear in that
the determination of whether a proceeding is quasi-criminal does
248. Id. at 10.
249. See, e.g., In re Keith, 569 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Fain. Ct. Dutchess County
1990); In re Andrew, 115 Misc. 2d 937, 454 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Fam. Ct.

Richmond County 1982); In re Kenneth, 114 Misc. 2d 676, 452 N.Y.S.2d 176
(Fam. Ct. Richmond County 1982).

250. 115 Misc. 2d 937, 454 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Fain. Ct. Richmond County
1982).
251. Id. at 939, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
252. Id. at 939, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 822 (quoting In re Reynaldo, 73 Misc. 2d
390, 394, 341 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1003 (Fam.Ct. Kings County 1973)). See also
In re Keith, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 557-58 (court was concerned with providing
procedural safeguards to protect fundamental constitutional rights where
liberty interests were at stake in a PINS proceeding); In re Kenneth, 114 Misc.
2d at 677, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 178 ("Juvenile delinquency proceedings are, at
least, quasi-criminal in nature ... [therefore] a juvenile respondent may be

subjected to a very significant interference with his freedom.") (citation
omitted).
253. See supra notes 243-52 and accompanying text.
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not hinge upon whether the proceeding is a prosecution for
25 4
criminal behavior.
The personal interest of a patient in danger of being forcibly
medicated is at least equivalent to the personal interest at issue in
a paternity proceeding. The patient's interest in being violated
physically and emotionally, as well as potentially suffering from
irreversible side effects of antipsychotic medication, certainly
surpasses any pecuniary loss. Furthermore, the involuntarily
committed patient has already lost the liberty interest facing a
putative father. Although the patient does not necessarily have a
familial interest, the civil committee does face possible permanent disfigurement as well as pain and discomfort resulting from
the administration of antipsychotic drugs.
The mere presence of such interests should lead to the classification of the involuntary treatment hearing as quasi-criminal in
nature, thereby extending the opportunity for independent psychiatric assistance to the indigent civil committee whose mental
capacity is in issue, as it is extended to the indigent criminal defendant whose mental capacity is in issue. Although the patient
does not necessarily have a familial interest, the civil committee
is in danger of being permanently injured by the administration of
the antipsychotic drugs. 255 As noted by the Supreme Court in
Little v. Streater, "[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances." ' 256 Rather, the Court concluded that
the concept of due process "is flexible and calls for such proce257
dural protections as the particular situation demands."
CONCLUSION

The right of a patient to receive a Rivers hearing before
treatment is administered involuntarily is an empty shell of
formality unless it is given substantive effect by providing the
254. See supra note 243.
255. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
256. 452 U.S. 1, 5 (1981) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)).

257. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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patient with proper tools to present an effective defense to
allegations of incompetency or dangerousness. One court has held
that "[n]o matter how brilliant the lawyer may be, he is in no
position to effectively contest the commitment proceedings
because he has no way to rebut the testimony of the psychiatrist
from the institution who has already certified to the patient's
insanity .... ,258
As previously shown, federal and New York State courts have
recognized the necessity of independent psychiatric assistance to
indigent criminal defendants whose mental capacity is in issue.
This Comment has also purported that the liberties at stake in
both the Rivers hearing and the indigent criminal defendant's trial
are sufficiently similar to extend the right to independent
psychiatric assistance to the indigent civil committee.
Finally, this Comment presented the opinion of at least one
court which acknowledged that such assistance may, indeed, be
necessary for the indigent civil committee's due process rights to
be properly protected. 259 Consequently, "[d]ue process requires,
at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of
overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of
right and duty through the judicial process must be given a
meaningful opportunity to be heard." ' 260 In order for the due
process rights recognized in Rivers to be adequately protected, an
involuntarily committed patient in danger of being forcibly
medicated must have access to an independent psychiatrist so that
a meaningful defense may be prepared to rebut the state's
allegations of incompetency.
Marcy H. Speiser

258. In re Gannon, 123 N.J. Super. 104, 105, 301 A.2d 493, 494

(Somerset County Ct. 1973).
259 See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
260. Little, 452 U.S. at 5-6 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
377 (1971)).
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